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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved
unprecedented performance on a wide range of
complex tasks, rapidly outpacing our understand-
ing of the nature of their solutions. This has
caused a recent surge of interest in methods
for rendering modern neural systems more inter-
pretable. In this work, we propose to address the
interpretability problem in modern DNNs using
the rich history of problem descriptions, theo-
ries and experimental methods developed by cog-
nitive psychologists to study the human mind.
To explore the potential value of these tools,
we chose a well-established analysis from de-
velopmental psychology that explains how chil-
dren learn word labels for objects, and applied
that analysis to DNNs. Using datasets of stim-
uli inspired by the original cognitive psychol-
ogy experiments, we find that state-of-the-art
one shot learning models trained on ImageNet
exhibit a similar bias to that observed in hu-
mans: they prefer to categorize objects accord-
ing to shape rather than color. The magnitude
of this shape bias varies greatly among archi-
tecturally identical, but differently seeded mod-
els, and even fluctuates within seeds through-
out training, despite nearly equivalent classifi-
cation performance. These results demonstrate
the capability of tools from cognitive psychology
for exposing hidden computational properties of
DNNs, while concurrently providing us with a
computational model for human word learning.
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1. Introduction
During the last half-decade deep learning has significantly
improved performance on a variety of tasks (for a review,
see LeCun et al. (2015)). However, deep neural network
(DNN) solutions remain poorly understood, leaving many
to think of these models as black boxes, and to question
whether they can be understood at all (Bornstein, 2016;
Lipton, 2016). This opacity obstructs both basic research
seeking to improve these models, and applications of these
models to real world problems (Caruana et al., 2015).
Recent pushes have aimed to better understand DNNs:
tailor-made loss functions and architectures produce more
interpretable features (Higgins et al., 2016; Raposo et al.,
2017) while output-behavior analyses unveil previously
opaque operations of these networks (Karpathy et al.,
2015). Parallel to this work, neuroscience-inspired meth-
ods such as activation visualization (Li et al., 2015), abla-
tion analysis (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014) and activation maxi-
mization (Yosinski et al., 2015) have also been applied.
Altogether, this line of research developed a set of promis-
ing tools for understanding DNNs, each paper producing
a glimmer of insight. Here, we propose another tool for
the kit, leveraging methods inspired not by neuroscience,
but instead by psychology. Cognitive psychologists have
long wrestled with the problem of understanding another
opaque intelligent system: the human mind. We contend
that the search for a better understanding of DNNs may
profit from the rich heritage of problem descriptions, the-
ories, and experimental tools developed in cognitive psy-
chology. To test this belief, we performed a proof-of-
concept study on state-of-the-art DNNs that solve a par-
ticularly challenging task: one-shot word learning. Specif-
ically, we investigate Matching Networks (MNs) (Vinyals
et al., 2016), which have state-of-the-art one-shot learning
performance on ImageNet and we investigate an Inception
Baseline model (Szegedy et al., 2015a).
Following the approach used in cognitive psychology, we
began by hypothesizing an inductive bias our model may
use to solve a word learning task. Research in develop-
mental psychology shows that when learning new words,
humans tend to assign the same name to similarly shaped
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items rather than to items with similar color, texture, or
size. To test the hypothesis that our DNNs discover this
same “shape bias”, we probed our models using datasets
and an experimental setup based on the original shape bias
studies (Landau et al., 1988).
Our results are as follows: 1) Inception networks trained on
ImageNet do indeed display a strong shape bias. 2) There
is high variance in the bias between Inception networks
initialized with different random seeds, demonstrating that
otherwise identical networks converge to qualitatively dif-
ferent solutions. 3) MNs also have a strong shape bias, and
this bias closely mimics the bias of the Inception model
that provides input to the MN. 4) By emulating the shape
bias observed in children, these models provide a candidate
computational account for human one-shot word learning.
Altogether, these results show that the technique of testing
hypothesized biases using probe datasets can yield both ex-
pected and surprising insights about solutions discovered
by trained DNNs.
1.1. Related Work: Cognitive Modeling with Neural
Networks
The use of behavioral probes to understand neural network
function has been extensively applied within psychology
itself, where neural networks have been employed effec-
tively as models of human cognitive function (Rumelhart
et al., 1988; Plaut et al., 1996; Rogers & McClelland, 2004;
Mareschal et al., 2000). In contrast, in the present work
we are advocating for the application of behavioral probes
along with associated theories and hypotheses from cogni-
tive psychology to address the interpretability problem in
modern deep networks.
In spite of the widespread adoption of deep learning meth-
ods in recent years, to our knowledge, work applying be-
havioral probes to DNNs in machine learning for this pur-
pose has been quite limited; we only are aware of Zo-
ran et al. (2015) and Goodfellow et al. (2009), who used
psychophysics-like experiments to better understand image
processing models.
2. Inductive Biases, Statistical Learners and
Probe Datasets
Before we delve into the specifics of the shape bias and
one-shot word learning, we will describe our approach in
the general context of inductive biases, probe datasets, and
statistical learning. Suppose we have some data {yi, xi}Ni=1
where yi = f(xi). Our goal is to build a model of the
data g(.) to optimize some loss function L measuring the
disparity between y and g(x), e.g., L =
∑
i ||yi− g(xi)||2.
Perhaps this data x is images of ImageNet objects to be
classified, images and histology of tumors to be classified
as benign or malignant (Kourou et al., 2015), or medical
history and vital measurements to be classified according
to likely pneumonia outcomes (Caruana et al., 2015).
A statistical learner such as a DNN will minimize L by
discovering properties of the input x that are predictive of
the labels y. These discovered predictive properties are, in
effect, the properties of x for which the trained model has
an inductive bias. Examples of such properties include the
shape of ImageNet objects, the number of nodes of a tumor,
or a particular constellation of blood test values that often
precedes an exacerbation of pneumonia symptoms.
Critically, in real-world datasets such as these, the discov-
ered properties are unlikely to correspond to a single fea-
ture of the input x; instead they correspond to complex
conjunctions of those features. We could describe one of
these properties using a function h(x), which, for example,
returns the shape of the focal object given an ImageNet im-
age, or the number of nodes given a scan of tumor. Indeed,
one way to articulate the difficulty in understanding DNNs
is to say that we often can’t intuitively describe these con-
junctions of features h(x); although we often have numeri-
cal representations in intermediate DNN layers, they’re of-
ten too arcane for us to interpret.
We advocate for addressing this problem using the follow-
ing hypothesis-driven approach: First, propose a property
hp(x) that the model may be using. Critically, it’s not nec-
essary that hp(x) be a function that can be evaluated using
an automated method. Instead, the intention is that hp(x)
is a function that humans (e.g. ML researchers and practi-
tioners) can intuitively evaluate. hp(x) should be a prop-
erty that is believed to be relevant to the problem, such as
object shape or number of tumor nodes.
After proposing a property, the next step is to generate pre-
dictions about how the model should behave when given
various inputs, if in fact it uses a bias with respect to the
property hp(x). Then, construct and carry out an experi-
ment wherein those predictions are tested. In order to ex-
ecute such an experiment, it typically will be necessary to
craft a set of probe examples x that cover a relevant por-
tion of the range of hp(x), for example a variety of object
shapes. The results of this experiment will either support
or fail to support the hypothesis that the model uses hp(x)
to solve the task. This process can be especially valuable in
situations where there is little or no training data available
in important regions of the input space, and a practitioner
needs to know how the trained model will behave in that
region.
Psychologists have developed a repertoire of such hypothe-
ses and experiments in their effort to understand the hu-
man mind. Here we explore the application of one of these
theory-experiment pairs to state of the art one-shot learning
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models. We will begin by describing the historical back-
drop for the human one-shot word learning experiments
that we will then apply to our DNNs.
3. The problem of word learning; the solution
of inductive biases
Discussions of one-shot word learning in the psychologi-
cal literature inevitably begin with the philosopher W.V.O.
Quine, who broke this problem down and described one
of its most computationally challenging components: there
are an enormous number of tenable hypotheses that a
learner can use to explain a single observed example. To
make this point, Quine penned his now-famous parable of
the field linguist who has gone to visit a culture whose lan-
guage is entirely different from our own (Quine, 1960).
The linguist is trying to learn some words from a helpful
native, when a rabbit runs past. The native declares “gava-
gai”, and the linguist is left to infer the meaning of this new
word. Quine points out that the linguist is faced with an
abundance of possible inferences, including that “gavagai”
refers to rabbits, animals, white things, that specific rabbit,
or “undetached parts of rabbits”. Quine argues that indeed
there is an infinity of possible inferences to be made, and
uses this conclusion to bolster the assertion that meaning
itself cannot be defined in terms of internal mental events1.
Contrary to Quine’s intentions, when this example was in-
troduced to the developmental psychology community by
Macnamara (1972), it spurred them not to give up on the
idea of internal meaning, but instead to posit and test for
cognitive biases that enable children to eliminate broad
swaths of the hypothesis space (Bloom, 2000). A variety of
hypothesis-eliminating biases were then proposed includ-
ing the whole object bias, by which children assume that
a word refers to an entire object and not its components
(Markman, 1990); the taxonomic bias, by which children
assume a word refers to the basic level category an object
belongs to (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984); the mutual ex-
clusivity bias, by which children assume that a word only
refers to one object category (Markman & Wachtel, 1988);
the shape bias, with which we are concerned here (Landau
et al., 1988); and a variety of others (Bloom, 2000). These
biases were tested empirically in experiments wherein chil-
dren or adults were given an object (or picture of an ob-
ject) along with a novel name, then were asked whether the
name should apply to various other objects.
Taken as a whole, this work yielded a computational level
(Marr, 1982) account of word learning whereby people
make use of biases to eliminate unlikely hypotheses when
inferring the meaning of new words. Other contrasting
and complementary approaches to explaining word learn-
ing exist in the psychological literature, including associa-
tion learning (Regier, 1996; Colunga & Smith, 2005) and
Bayesian inference (Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007). We leave
the application of these theories to deep learning models
to future work, and focus on determining what insight can
be gained by applying a hypothesis elimination theory and
methodology.
We begin the present work with the knowledge that part
of the hypothesis elimination theory is correct: the models
surely use some kind of inductive biases since they are sta-
tistical learning machines that successfully model the map-
ping between images and object labels. However, several
questions remain open. What predictive properties did our
DNNs find? Do all of them find the same properties? Are
any of those properties interpretable to humans? Are they
the same properties that children use? How do these biases
change over the course of training?
To address these questions, we carry out experiments anal-
ogous to those of Landau et al. (1988). This enables us to
test whether the shape bias – a human interpretable feature
used by children when learning language – is visible in the
behavior of MNs and Inception networks. Furthermore we
are able to test whether these two models, as well as differ-
ent instances of each of them, display the same bias. In the
next section we will describe in detail the one-shot word
learning problem, and the MNs and Inception networks we
use to solve it.
4. One-shot word learning models and
training
4.1. One-shot word learning task
The one-shot word learning task is to label a novel data ex-
ample xˆ (e.g. a novel probe image) with a novel class label
yˆ (e.g. a new word) after only a single example. More
specifically, given a support set S = {(xi, yi) : i ∈ [1, k]},
of images xi and their associated labels yi, and an unla-
belled probe image xˆ, the one-shot learning task is to iden-
tify the true label of the probe image yˆ from the support set
labels {yi : i ∈ [1, k]}:
yˆ = argmax
y
P (y|xˆ, S). (1)
We assume that the image labels yi are represented using a
one-hot encoding and that P (y|xˆ, S) is parameterised by a
DNN, allowing us to leverage the ability of deep networks
to learn powerful representations.
4.2. Inception: baseline one-shot learning model
In our simplest baseline one-shot architecture, a probe im-
age xˆ is given the label of the nearest neighbour from the
1Unlike Quine, we use a pragmatic definition of meaning - a
human or model understands the meaning of a word if they assign
that word to new instances of objects in the correct category.
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support set:
yˆ = y
(x, y) = arg min
(xi,yi)∈S
d(h(xi), h(xˆ))
(2)
where d is a distance function. The function h is parame-
terised by Inception – one of the best performing ImageNet
classification models (Szegedy et al., 2015a). Specifically,
h returns features from the last layer (the softmax input) of
a pre-trained Inception classifier, where the Inception clas-
sifier is trained using rms-prop, as described in Szegedy
et al. (2015b), section 8. With these features as input and
cosine distance as the distance function, the classifier in
equation 2 achieves 87.6% accuracy on one-shot classifica-
tion on the ImageNet dataset (Vinyals et al., 2016). Hence-
forth, we call the Inception classifier together with the
nearest-neighbor component the Inception Baseline (IB)
model.
4.3. Matching Nets model architecture and training
We also investigate a state-of-the-art one-shot learning
architecture called Matching Nets (MN) (Vinyals et al.,
2016). MNs are a fully differentiable neural network archi-
tecture with state-of-the-art one shot learning performance
on ImageNet (93.2% one-shot labelling accuracy).
MNs are trained to assign label yˆ to probe image xˆ accord-
ing to equation 1 using an attention mechanism a acting on
image embeddings stored in the support set S:
a(xˆ, xi) =
ed(f(xˆ,S),g(xi,S))∑
j e
d(f(xˆ,S),g(xj ,S))
, (3)
where d is a cosine distance and where f and g provide
context-dependent embeddings of xˆ and xi (with context
S). The embedding g(xi, S) is a bi-directional LSTM
(Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) with the support set S
provided as an input sequence. The embedding f(xˆ, S) is
an LSTM with a read-attention mechanism operating over
the entire embedded support set. The input to the LSTM
is given by the penultimate layer features of a pre-trained
deep convolutional network, specifically Inception, as in
our baseline IB model described above (Szegedy et al.,
2015a).
The training procedure for the one-shot learning task is crit-
ical if we want MNs to classify a probe image xˆ after view-
ing only a single example of this new image class in its
support set (Hochreiter et al., 2001; Santoro et al., 2016).
To train MNs we proceed as follows: (1) At each step of
training, the model is given a small support set of images
and associated labels. In addition to the support set, the
model is fed an unlabelled probe image xˆ; (2) The model
parameters are then updated to improve classification ac-
curacy of the probe image xˆ given the support set. Pa-
rameters are updated using stochastic gradient descent with
a learning rate of 0.1; (3) After each update, the labels
{yi : i ∈ [1, k]} in the training set are randomly re-assigned
to new image classes (the label indices are randomly per-
muted, but the image labels are not changed). This is a
critical step. It prevents MNs from learning a consistent
mapping between a category and a label. Usually, in clas-
sification, this is what we want, but in one-shot learning we
want to train our model for classification after viewing a
single in-class example from the support set. Formally, our
objective function is:
L = EC∼T
ES∼C,B∼C
 ∑
(x,y)∈B
logP (y|x, S)
 (4)
where T is the set of all possible labelings of our classes, S
is a support set sampled with a class labelling C ∼ T and
B is a batch of probe images and labels, also with the same
randomly chosen class labelling as the support set.
Next we will describe the probe datasets we used to test for
the shape bias in the IB and MNs after ImageNet training.
5. Data for bias discovery
5.1. Cognitive Psychology Probe Data
The Cognitive Psychology Probe Data (CogPsyc data) that
we use consists of 150 images of objects (Figure 1). The
images are arranged in triples consisting of a probe im-
age, a shape-match image (that matches the probe in colour
but not shape), and a color-match image (that matches the
probe in shape but not colour). In the dataset there are 10
triples, each shown on 5 different backgrounds, giving a
total of 50 triples.2
The images were generously provided by cognitive psy-
chologist Linda Smith. The images are photographs of
stimuli used previously in shape bias experiments con-
ducted in the Cognitive Development Lab at Indiana Uni-
versity. The potentially confounding variables of back-
ground content and object size are controlled in this dataset.
5.2. Probe Data from the wild
We have also assembled a real-world dataset consisting of
90 images of objects (30 triples) collected using Google
Image Search. Again, the images are arranged in triples
consisting of a probe, a shape-match and a colour-match.
For the probe image, we chose images of real objects that
are unlikely to appear in standard image datasets such as
ImageNet. In this way, our data contains the irregularity
2 The CogPsyc dataset is available at http://www.
indiana.edu/˜cogdev/SB_testsets.html
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colour match shape match probe
Figure 1. Example images from the Cognitive Psychology
Dataset (see section 5). The data consists of image triples (rows),
each containing a colour match image (left column), a shape
match image (middle column) and a probe image (right column).
We use these triples to calculate the shape bias by reporting the
proportion of times that a model assigns the shape match image
class to the probe image. This dataset was supplied by cognitive
psychologist Linda Smith, and was designed to control for object
size and background.
of the real world while also probing our models’ properties
outside of the image space covered in our training data. For
the shape-match image, we chose an object with a similar
shape (but with a very different colour), and for the colour-
match image, we chose an object with a similar colour (but
with a very different shape). For example, one triple con-
sists of a silver tuning fork as the probe, a silver guitar capo
as the colour match, and a black tuning fork as the shape
match. Each photo in the dataset contains a single object
on a white background.
We collected this data to strengthen our confidence in the
results obtained for the CogPsych dataset and to demon-
strate the ease with which such probe datasets can be con-
structed. One of the authors crafted this dataset solely us-
ing Google Image Search in the span of roughly two days’
work. Our results with this dataset, especially the fact that
the bias pattern over time matches the results from the well
established CogPsych dataset, support the contention that
DNN practitioners can collect effective probe datasets with
minimal time expenditure using readily available tools.
6. Results
6.1. Shape bias in the Inception Baseline Model
First, we measured the shape bias in IB: we used a pre-
trained Inception classifier (with 94% top-5 accuracy) to
provide features for our nearest-neighbour one-shot clas-
sifier, and probed the model using the CogPsyc dataset.
Specifically, for a given probe image xˆ, we loaded the
shape-match image xs and corresponding label ys, along
with the colour-match image xc and corresponding label
yc into memory, as the support set S = {(xs, ys), (xc, yc)}.
We then calculated yˆ using Equation 2. Our model assigned
either yc or ys to the probe image. To estimate the shape
bias Bs, we calculated the proportion of shape labels as-
signed to the probe:
Bs = E(δ(yˆ − ys)), (5)
where E is an expectation across probe images and δ is the
Dirac delta function.
We ran all IB experiments using both Euclidean and cosine
distance as the distance function. We found that the results
for the two distance functions were qualitatively similar, so
we only report results for Euclidean distance.
We found the shape bias of IB to be Bs = 0.68. Simi-
larly, the shape bias of IB using our real-world dataset was
Bs = 0.97. Together, these results strongly suggest that IB
trained on ImageNet has a stronger bias towards shape than
colour.
Note that, as expected, the shape bias of this model is qual-
itatively similar across datasets while being quantitatively
different - largely because the datasets themselves are quite
different. Indeed, the datasets were chosen to be quite
different so that we could explore a broad space of pos-
sibilities. In particular, our CogPsyc dataset backgrounds
have much larger variability than our real-world dataset
backgrounds, and our real-world dataset objects have much
greater variability than the CogPsyc dataset objects.
6.2. Shape bias in the Matching Nets Model
Next, we probed the MNs using a similar procedure. We
used the IB trained in the previous section to provide the
input features for the MN as described in section 4.3.
Then, following the training procedure outlined in section
4.3 we trained MNs for one-shot word learning on Ima-
geNet, achieving state-of-the-art performance, as reported
in (Vinyals et al., 2016). Then, repeating the analysis
above, we found that MNs have a shape of bias Bs = 0.7
using our CogPsyc dataset and a bias of Bs = 1 using the
real-world dataset. It is interesting to note that these bias
values are very similar to the IB bias values.
6.3. Shape bias statistics: within models and across
models
The observation of a shape bias immediately raises some
important questions. In particular: (1) Does this bias de-
pend on the initial values of the parameters in our model?
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Figure 2. Shape bias across models with different initialization seeds, and within models during training calculated using the CogPsyc
dataset. (a) The shape bias Bs of 15 Inception models is calculated throughout training (yellow lines). A strong shape bias emerges
across all models. A bias valueBs > 0.5 indicates a shape bias andBs < 0.5 indicates a colour bias. Two examples are highlighted here
(blue and red lines) for clarity. (b) The shape bias fluctuates strongly within models during training by up to three standard deviations.
(c) The distribution of bias values, calculated at the start (blue), middle (red) and end (yellow) of training. Bias variability is high at the
start and end of training. Here, these distributions are calculated using kernel density estimates from all shape bias measurements from
all models within the indicated window.
Figure 3. Classification accuracy of all 15 Inception models eval-
uated on a test set during training on ImageNet (same models as in
Figure 2) . All 15 Inception network seeds achieve near identical
test accuracy (overlapping yellow lines).
(2) Does the size of the shape bias depend on model perfor-
mance? (3) When does shape bias emerge during training
- before model convergence or afterwards? (4) How does
shape bias compare between models, and within models?
To answer these questions, we extended the shape bias
analysis described above to calculate the shape bias in a
population of IB models and in a population of MN models
with different random initialization (Figs. 2 and 5).
(1) We first calculated the dependence of shape bias on the
initialization of IB (Fig. 2). Surprisingly, we observed a
strong variability, depending on the initialization. For the
CogPsyc dataset, the average shape bias was Bs = 0.628
with standard deviation σBs = 0.049 at the end of training
and for the real-world dataset the average shape bias was
Bs = 0.958 with σBs = 0.037.
(2) Next, we calculated the dependence of shape bias on
model performance. For the CogPsych dataset, the corre-
Figure 4. Scatter plot showing Matching Network (MN) bias as
a function of Inception bias. Each MN receives input through
an Inception model. Each point in this scatter plot is the bias
of a MN and the bias of the Inception model providing input to
that particular MN. In total, the bias values of 45 MN models are
plotted (some dots are overlapping).
lation between bias and classification accuracy was ρ =
0.15, with tn=15 = 0.55, pone tail = 0.29, and for the
real-world dataset, the correlation was ρ = −0.06 with
tn=15 = −0.22, pone tail = 0.42. Therefore, fluctuations
in the bias cannot be accounted for by fluctuations in clas-
sification accuracy. This is not surprising, because the clas-
sification accuracy of all models was similar at the end of
training, while the shape bias was variable. This demon-
strates that models can have variable behaviour along im-
portant dimensions (e.g., bias) while having the same per-
formance measured by another (e.g., accuracy).
(3) Next we explored the emergence of the shape bias dur-
ing training (Fig. 2a,c; Fig. 5a,c). At the start of train-
ing, the average shape bias of these models was Bs =
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25000-50000
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Figure 5. Shape bias across models with different initialization seeds, and within models during training calculated using the real-world
dataset. (a) The shape bias Bs of 15 Inception models is calculated throughout training (yellow lines). A strong shape bias emerges
across all models. Two examples are highlighted here (blue and red lines) for clarity. (b) The shape bias fluctuates strongly within
models during training. (c) The distribution of bias values, calculated at the start (blue), middle (red) and end (yellow) of training. Bias
variability is high at the start and end of training.
0.448 with standard deviation σBs = 0.0835 on the Cog-
Psyc dataset and Bs = 0.593 with σBs = 0.073 on the
real-world dataset. We observe that a shape bias began
to emerge very early during training, long before conver-
gence.
(4) Finally, we compare shape bias within models during
training, and between models at the end of training. Dur-
ing training, the shape bias within IB fluctuates signifi-
cantly (Fig. 2 b; Fig. 5b). In contrast, the shape bias does
not fluctuate during training of the MN. Instead, the MN
model inherits its shape bias characteristics at the start of
training from the IB that provides it with input embeddings
(Fig. 4) and this shape-bias remains constant throughout
training. Moreover, there is no evidence that the MN and
corresponding IB bias values are different from each other
(paired t-test, p = 0.167). Note that we do not fine-tune the
Inception model providing input while training the MN. We
do this so that we can observe the shape-bias properties of
the MN independent of the IB model properties.
7. Discussion
7.1. A shape bias case study
Our psychology-inspired approach to understanding DNNs
produced a number of insights. Firstly, we found that both
IB and MNs trained on ImageNet display a strong shape
bias. This is an important result for practitioners who rou-
tinely use these models - especially for applications where
it is known a priori that colour is more important than
shape. As an illustrative example, if a practitioner planned
to build a one-shot fruit classification system, they should
proceed with caution if they plan to use pre-trained Ima-
geNet models like Inception and MNs because fruit are of-
ten defined according to colour features rather than shape.
In applications where a shape bias is desirable (as is more
often the case than not), this result provides reassurance
that the models are behaving sensibly in the presence of
ambiguity.
The second surprising finding was the large variability in
shape bias, both within models during training and across
models, depending on the randomly chosen initialisation
of our model. This variability can arise because our mod-
els are not being explicitly optimised for shape biased cate-
gorisation. This is an important result because it shows that
not all models are created equally - some models will have
a stronger preference for shape than others, even though
they are architecturally identical and have almost identical
classification accuracy.
Our third finding – that MNs retain the shape bias statis-
tics of the downstream Inception network – demonstrates
the possibility for biases to propagate across model com-
ponents. In this case, the shape bias propagates from the
Inception model through to the MN memory modules. This
result is yet another cautionary observation; when combin-
ing multiple modules together, we must be aware of con-
tamination by unknown properties across modules. Indeed,
a bias that is benign in one module might only have a detri-
mental effect when combined later with other modules.
A natural question immediately arises from these results -
how can we remove an unwanted bias or induce a desir-
able bias? The biases under consideration are properties of
an architecture and dataset synthesized together by an op-
timization procedure. As such, the observation of a shape-
bias is partly a result of the statistics of natural image-
labellings as captured in the ImageNet dataset, and partly a
result of the architecture attempting to extract these statis-
tics. Therefore, on discovering an unwanted bias, a practi-
tioner can either attempt to change the model architecture
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to explicitly prevent the bias from emerging, or, they can at-
tempt to manipulate the training data. If neither of these are
possible - for example, if the appropriate data manipulation
is too expensive, or, if the bias cannot be easily suppressed
in the architecture, it may be possible to do zero-th order
optimization of the models. For example, one may perform
post-hoc model selection either using early stopping or by
selecting a suitable model from the set of initial seeds.
An important caveat to note is that behavioral tools often
do not provide insight into the neural mechanisms. In our
case, the DNN mechanism whereby model parameters and
input images interact to give rise to a shape bias have not
been elucidated, nor did we expect this to happen. Indeed,
just as cognitive psychology often does for neuroscience,
our new computational level insights can provide a starting
point for research at the mechanistic level. For example,
in future work it would be interesting to use gradient-based
visualization or neuron ablation techniques to augment the
current results by identifying the mechanisms underlying
the shape bias. The convergence of evidence from such
introspective methods with the current behavioral method
would create a richer account of these models’ solutions to
the one-shot word learning problem.
7.2. Modelling human word learning
There have been previous attempts to model human word
learning in the cognitive science literature (Colunga &
Smith, 2005; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007; Schilling et al.,
2012; Mayor & Plunkett, 2010). However, none of these
models are capable of one-shot word learning on the scale
of real-world images. Because MNs both solve the task
at scale and emulate hallmark experimental findings, we
propose MNs as a computational-level account of human
one-shot word learning. Another feature of our results sup-
ports this contention: in our model the shape bias increases
dramatically early in training (Fig. 2a); similarly, humans
show the shape bias much more strongly as adults than as
children, and older children show the bias more strongly
than younger children (Landau et al., 1988).
As a good cognitive model should, our DNNs make testable
predictions about word-learning in humans. Specifically,
the current results predict that the shape bias should vary
across subjects as well as within a subject over the course
of development. They also predict that for humans with
adult-level one-shot word learning abilities, there should
be no correlation between shape bias magnitude and one-
shot-word learning capability.
Another promising direction for future cognitive research
would be to probe MNs for additional biases in order to
predict novel computational properties in humans. Probing
a model in this way is much faster than running human be-
havioural experiments, so a wider range of hypotheses for
human word learning may be rapidly tested.
7.3. Cognitive Psychology for Deep Neural Networks
Through the one-shot learning case study, we demonstrated
the utility of leveraging techniques from cognitive psy-
chology for understanding the computational properties of
DNNs. There is a wide ranging literature in cognitive psy-
chology describing techniques for probing a spectrum of
behaviours in humans. Our work here leads the way to the
study of artificial cognitive psychology - the application of
these techniques to better understand DNNs.
For example, it would be useful to apply work from the
massive literature on episodic memory (Tulving, 1985) to
the recent flurry of episodic memory architectures (Blun-
dell et al., 2016; Graves et al., 2016), and to apply tech-
niques from the semantic cognition literature (Lamberts &
Shanks, 2013) to recent models of concept formation (Hig-
gins et al., 2016; Gregor et al., 2016; Raposo et al., 2017).
More generally, the rich psychological literature will be-
come increasingly useful for understanding deep reinforce-
ment learning agents as they learn to solve increasingly
complex tasks.
8. Conclusion
In this work, we have demonstrated how techniques from
cognitive psychology can be leveraged to help us better un-
derstand DNNs. As a case study, we measured the shape
bias in two powerful yet poorly understood DNNs - Incep-
tion and MNs. Our analysis revealed previously unknown
properties of these models. More generally, our work leads
the way for future exploration of DNNs using the rich body
of techniques developed in cognitive psychology.
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